We develop a multisector model in which capital and labor are free to move across …rms within each sector, but cannot move across sectors. To isolate the role of sectoral speci…city, we compare our model with otherwise identical multisector economies with either economy-wide factor markets (as in Chari et al. 2000) or …rm-speci…c factor markets (as in Woodford 2005). Sectoral speci…city induces within-sector strategic substitutability and across-sector strategic complementarity in price setting. Our model can produce either more or less monetary non-neutrality than those other two models, depending on the distribution of price rigidity across sectors. Under the empirical distribution for the U.S., our model behaves similarly to an economy with …rm-speci…c factors in the short-run, and later on approaches the dynamics of the model with economy-wide factor markets. This is consistent with the idea that factor price equalization might take place gradually over time, so that …rm-speci…city might be a reasonable short-run approximation, whereas economywide markets might be a better description of how factors of production are allocated in the longer run.
Introduction
Much of the Monetary Economics literature tries to make sense of the extent of monetary nonneutrality that is apparent in the data. An important part of this literature does so by resorting to models in which prices (and sometimes wages) are sticky. A problem with bare bone versions of these models is that the degree of price rigidity required to generate substantial non-neutrality is at odds with the microeconomic evidence on the frequency of price changes. However, since Ball and Romer (1990) and Kimball (1995) , it is well-known that large real rigidities -which can induce strategic complementarities in price-setting decisions -can generate substantial endogenous persistence in the real e¤ects of monetary shocks, and thus help bridge this gap. 1 In a series of contributions to our understanding of the sources of real rigidities, Woodford (2003 Woodford ( , 2004 Woodford ( , 2005 argues forcefully that factor speci…city matters. In particular, Woodford (2005) develops a model in which both capital and labor are speci…c to …rms -i.e., they cannot move freely from one …rm to another. 2 He shows that factor speci…city at the …rm level is a powerful source of real rigidities.
The assumption of …rm-level speci…city contrasts sharply with the (usually unstated) assumption that factors of production can move freely across …rms, as in the Real Business Cycle literature.
Under standard assumptions about preferences and technology, such economy-wide factor markets tend to induce strategic substitutability in price setting (e.g., Woodford 2003, chap. 3) , and thus generate a small degree of monetary non-neutrality (Chari et al. 2000) .
The two alternative assumptions about factor markets are, to some extent, unrealistic. It is likely that factor price equalization takes place gradually over time, so that …rm-speci…city might be a reasonable short-run approximation, whereas economy-wide markets might be a better description of how factors of production are allocated in the longer run.
In this paper, we study whether the nature of factor speci…city matters. To that end, we develop a multisector model in which capital and labor are free to move across …rms within each sector, but cannot move across sectors -i.e., factors of production are sector-speci…c. To isolate the role of sectoral speci…city, we compare our model with otherwise identical multisector economies with either economy-wide factor markets (as in Chari et al. 2000) or …rm-speci…c factor markets (as in Woodford 2005 ).
It turns out that it matters a great deal whether factor markets are speci…c at the …rm or at the sector level. Sectoral factor speci…city does not induce real rigidities as in the case of …rm-speci…c factors. In fact, it generates within-sector strategic substitutability in pricing decisions. This tends 1 Other such mechanisms have to do with information frictions, heterogenity in price rigidity etc. 2 To be precise, Woodford's (2003 Woodford's ( , 2005 ) models features industry-speci…c labor coupled with assumptions that make it mathematically equivalent to a particular model with …rm-speci…c labor models, as will become clear subsequently.
to reduce the degree of monetary non-neutrality relative to the case of …rm-speci…c factors. At the same time, sectoral relative price movements generate distributional e¤ects that induce strategic complementarity in pricing decisions across sectors, relative to the model with economy-wide factor markets. Our sector-speci…c factor model can produce either more or less monetary non-neutrality than those other two models, depending on the distribution of price rigidity across sectors. Under the empirical distribution for the U.S., our model behaves similarly to an economy with …rm-speci…c factors in the short-run, and later on approaches the dynamics of the model with economy-wide factor markets.
As shown by Woodford (2005) , …rm-speci…c capital is a powerful source of real rigidities, and thus tends to induce strategic complementarities in …rms' pricing decisions. To understand the mechanism at work, consider …rst the case of economy-wide factor markets. This market structure tends to make …rms'pricing decisions strategic substitutes rather than complements. This is because …rms that do not respond to an increase in aggregate demand with a price increase need to employ disproportionately more production inputs. This puts upward pressure on factor prices, and leads …rms that do adjust prices in response to the demand increase to set relatively higher prices. This cost pressure transmitted through common factor markets tends to speed up the response of the aggregate price level to an increase in nominal demand, thus decreasing the persistence of its real e¤ects on output and other real variables. Now let us consider the case of …rm-speci…c factor markets. Under the same circumstances, adjusting …rms will have less of an incentive to increase their prices. The reason is that marginal costs no longer depend on common factor prices, but are instead speci…c to each …rm. Consider an increase in nominal aggregate demand as in our analysis of economy-wide factor markets. Let us assume that adjusting …rms choose to increase prices by as much as they would in that case. With …rm-speci…c factors, the relative decrease in the quantity demanded from each adjusting …rm, which is induced by higher prices, puts downward pressure on (…rm-speci…c) factor prices, relative to the case of economy-wide factor markets. This makes it suboptimal for …rms to raise prices by as much as in that case. In other words, …rm-speci…c factors lead …rms that change prices to keep them closer to other …rms' unchanged prices. This comparison shows that factor speci…city at the …rm level induces a complementarity (or weakens the degree of substitutability) in pricing decisions. The di¤erent implications of factor market structures for the interactions between …rms'pricing decisions is what leads to higher persistence of the real e¤ects of nominal disturbances in Woodford's model. So why is this not the case when factors are sector as opposed to …rm speci…c? Once again, the reason has to do with the implications of factor market structure for the interdependence between …rms' pricing decisions. To understand the mechanism at work when factors are sector speci…c, consider again an increase in demand. Firms that do not respond with a price increase need to employ disproportionately more production inputs. This puts upward pressure on sectoral factor prices, and leads …rms that do adjust prices in response to the demand increase to set relatively higher prices. This cost pressure transmitted through sectoral factor markets induces within-sector strategic substitutability in pricing decisions, muting the real e¤ects of nominal shocks. Note that the mechanism at work is very similar to the case of economy-wide factor markets, but applies at the sectoral level. Indeed, if all sectors are identical, these two models become indistinguishable. At the same time, consider an increase in prices everywhere in the economy, except in a given sector. This shifts demand in favor of that sector, and puts upward pressure on its marginal cost -thus leading …rms that change prices in that sector to increase their prices. This amounts to what we refer to as across-sector strategic complementarities in price setting. With heterogeneous sectors, the associated distributional e¤ects contribute to richer aggregate dynamics, as we discuss in Sections 3 and 4.
While the assumption that factors cannot move across sectors is certainly extreme, our model is motivated by existing empirical evidence that both capital (e.g., Ramey and Shapiro 2001) and labor (e.g., Parent 2000) have an important degree of sector (or industry) speci…city. Interestingly, our parameterized model delivers dynamics that are consistent with the idea that …rm-speci…city might be a good short-run approximation, whereas full factor mobility might be a better description for the long run. Section 2 presents the reference model of our multisector economy with sector-speci…c factors of production. It also presents the otherwise identical multisector models with either economy-wide or …rm-speci…c factor markets. Section 3 describes the underlying new Keynesian Phillips curves for the three models and discusses their properties. Section 4 follows with a quantitative analysis of the e¤ects of monetary shocks under the three types of factor speci…city. The last section concludes.
2 Three models of factor speci…city 2.1 Sector-speci…c factors 3 In this section, we consider a sticky-price DSGE model in which factor mobility is limited. Identical in…nitely-lived consumers supply labor and capital to intermediate …rms that they own, invest in a complete set of state-contingent …nancial claims, and consume a …nal good. The latter is produced by competitive …rms that bundle varieties of intermediate goods. The monopolistically competitive intermediate …rms that produce these varieties are divided into sectors that di¤er in their frequency of price changes. Labor and capital are the only variable inputs in the production of intermediate goods and we assume that these inputs can be reallocated freely across …rms in the same sector but cannot ‡ow across sectors.
Consumers
The representative consumer maximizes:
subject to the ‡ow budget constraint:
the law of motion for the stocks of sector-speci…c capital: 
where t;l Q l l 0 =t+1 l 0 1;l 0 , E t denotes the time-t expectations operator, C t is consumption of the …nal good, N s;t denotes total labor supplied to …rms in sector s, W s;t is the associated nominal wage rate, and ! s is the relative disutility of supplying labor to sector s. 4 I s;t denotes investment in sector-s capital, I t P S s=1 I s;t , K s;t is capital supplied to …rms in sector s, and Z s;t is the associated nominal return on capital. The …nal good can be used for either investment or consumption, and sells at the nominal price P t . B t+1 accounts for the state-contingent value of the portfolio of …nancial securities held by the consumer at the beginning of t + 1. Under complete …nancial markets, agents can choose the value of B t+1 for each possible state of the world at all times. T t stands for pro…ts received from intermediate …rms. A no-arbitrage condition requires the existence of a nominal stochastic discount factor t;t+1 that prices in period t any …nancial asset portfolio with state-contingent payo¤ B t+1 at the beginning of period t + 1. 5 Finally, is the time-discount factor, 1 denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, is the rate of depreciation, and 4 As in Carvalho and Lee (2011), this parameter is only used to obtain a symmetric steady state, and simplify the algebra. It does not play a role in any of our …ndings. For details see the online Appendix. 5 To avoid cluttering the notation, we omit explicit reference to the di¤erent states of nature. which is convex and satis…es ( ) = 1 and 0 ( ) = 0 and 00 ( ) = .
The …rst-order conditions for consumption and labor are:
For sector-s investment I s;t and capital K s;t+1 :
where Q s;t denotes Tobin's q for sector s.
The solution must also satisfy a transversality condition:
Final goods …rms
A representative competitive …rm produces the …nal good, which is a composite of varieties of in- 
where Y t is the …nal good, Y s;t is the aggregation of sector-s intermediate goods, and Y s;j;t is the variety produced by …rm j in sector s. The parameters 0, and > 1 are, respectively, the elasticity of substitution across sectors, and the elasticity of substitution within sectors.
The representative …nal-good-producing …rm solves:
which yields as …rst-order conditions, for j 2 [0; 1] and s = 1; :::; S:
The price indices are given by:
where P t is the price of the …nal good, P s;t is the price index of sector-s intermediate goods, and P s;j;t is the price charged by …rm j from sector s.
Intermediate goods …rms
Monopolistically competitive …rms produce varieties of the intermediate good by employing capital and labor. For analytical tractability, we assume that intermediate …rms set prices as in Calvo (1983) . The frequency of price changes varies across sectors, and it is the only source of (ex-ante)
heterogeneity. In each period, each …rm j in sector s changes its price independently with probability s . At each time a …rm j from sector s adjusts its price, it chooses X s;j;t to solve: where:
Given the optimality (cost-minimization) conditions for capital and labor, the real marginal cost can be expressed as:
:
Note that marginal costs are equalized only within sectors. This is a direct implication of the assumption of sectoral capital and labor markets.
Finally, under that assumption, the market-clearing condition for capital and investment are:
Firm-speci…c factors
We now consider a variant of the previous model in which production inputs are speci…c at the …rm 
Consumers
the law of motion for the stocks of each …rm-speci…c capital:
K s;j;t+1 = (1 ) K s;j;t + (I s;j;t ; K s;j;t ) I s;j;t ; 8 s; j I s;j;t 0; 8 s; j;
and a standard "no-Ponzi" condition:
where (I s;j;t ; K s;j;t ) now takes the form:
(I s;j;t ; K s;j;t ) = I s;j;t K s;j;t = 1 1 2
The notation is the same as before, except that now N s;j;t denotes total labor supplied to …rm j in sector s, W s;j;t is the associated nominal wage rate. I s;j;t denotes investment by …rm j in sector s, I t P S s=1 f s R 1 0 I s;j;t dj, K s;j;t is capital supplied to …rm j in sector s, and Z s;j;t is the associated nominal return on capital.
The …rst-order conditions for consumption and labor are now:
For all investment I s;j;t and capital K s;j;t+1 types: where Q s;j;t denote Tobin's q for …rm j in sector s.
Intermediate goods …rms
Once we introduce …rm-speci…c factor markets, the intermediate goods producer's problem also changes since wages and the return on capital will also be determined at the …rm level: :
Note that marginal costs are now …rm speci…c. This is a direct implication of the assumption of …rm-speci…c capital and labor markets.
Economy-wide factors
Finally, we consider a version of the model in which factors can move freely across …rms and sectors.
This requires that we reformulate the consumers'and intermediate …rms'problems once again. The maximization problem of …nal goods'…rms remains the same as before.
Consumer
and a standard "no-Ponzi" condition
where (I t ; K t ) now takes the form:
The notation is the same as before, except that N t is total labor supply, W t is the corresponding nominal wage rate, I t denotes investment, K t stands for capital, Z t is the associated nominal return on capital is the associated nominal return on capital.
For all investment I t and capital K t+1 types:
where Q t denotes the Tobin's q.
Intermediate goods …rms
Economy-wide capital and labor imply wages and the return on capital equalizing across …rms and sectors, and the intermediate …rm's problem becomes: where s;t is de…ned as before.
Note that marginal costs are equalized across …rms and sectors.
Monetary policy
In our baseline speci…cation we assume that the growth rate of nominal aggregate demand follows a …rst-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process, thus leaving monetary policy implicit. This speci…cation can be justi…ed through a cash-in-advance constraint when money growth itself follows an AR (1), or as the result of a monetary policy rule. Denoting nominal aggregate demand by M t P t Y t , we assume:
where m t log (M t ), m determines the autocorrelation in nominal aggregate demand growth, and " m;t is a purely monetary, uncorrelated, zero-mean, unit-variance i:
We analyze the model using a loglinear approximation around the zero-in ‡ation steady state.
While solving the models with sectoral and economy-wide factor markets is trivial, the model with …rm-speci…c capital is more challenging. The reason is that …rms can have di¤erent capital-accumulation histories. We solve that model by generalizing the approach pioneered by Woodford (2005) to the case of a multisector economy. Details of the solution are available upon request.
The underlying new Keynesian Phillips curves
After log-linearization around a zero in ‡ation steady state, each model presented in the previous section gives rise to a di¤erent New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). 6 We start with the more familiar case of economy-wide capital and labor markets. It leads to the following NKPC:
where
, and variables with a tilde superscript denote deviations from the underlying ‡exible-price equilibrium. 7 The last term on the right-hand-side of (5) is due to endogenous capital accumulation, 8 and the third term is reminiscent of multisector models with heterogeneity in price rigidity (Carvalho 2006) . The second term is the standard output gap component of the NKPC. 9 Note that in a model without capital and with the same frequency of price changes in all sectors ( , say), equation (5) collapses to the standard NKPC:
where = (1 (1 )) = (1 ). The coe¢ cient + ! that multiplies the output gap term in (5) is thus seen to correspond to the Ball and Romer (1990) index of real rigidities. As is well known, models with economy-wide factor markets tend to generate strategic substitutability in price setting, which obtains if + ! > 1. 10 This is why sticky-price models with economy-wide factor markets have di¢ culty generating a large amount of monetary non-neutrality with a reasonable amount of nominal price rigidity (e.g., Chari et al. 2000) .
Turning to the model with …rm-speci…c factors (Section 2.2), the underlying NKPC is given by:
where s is a function of structural parameters that is obtained (numerically) as the solution of a system of nonlinear equations (see the Appendix). Equation (6) generalizes the NKPC derived in Woodford (2005) to the case of a multisector economy with heterogeneity in price rigidity. The main di¤erence relative to the case of economywide factor markets is that all "gaps"are now multiplied by 1 s . As in Woodford (2005) , it is the case that s > 1 under reasonable parameterizations. Thus, under those parameterizations, …rm-speci…c factors are seen to mute the sensitivity of in ‡ation to aggregate and sectoral output gaps, and the investment gap. Firm-speci…city is thus a source of real rigidities. This is most easily seen in a version of this model without capital and with the same frequency of price changes in all sectors. In that case the NKPC simpli…es to:
where = 1+ . The reason why in ‡ation becomes less sensitive to the output gap can be understood by studying how factor speci…city at the …rm level a¤ects …rms' pricing decisions. Suppose the 8 Investment is de…ned as percentage deviation from its steady state. 9 Due to heterogeneity in price stickiness, the coe¢ cient associated with nominal price rigidities is a weighted average of the associated sectoral coe¢ cients P S s=1 fs s . 1 0 For a thorough discussion of sources of real rigidities in the canonical New Keynesian model see Woodford (2003, Ch. 3). economy is hit by a shock that induces a negative output gap, and thus puts downward pressure on prices. With economy-wide factor markets, …rms can cut prices as much as they want without any e¤ect on their marginal costs. In contrast, if labor is …rm-speci…c, …rms that set prices too low will attract more demand, will have to hire more labor for production, and will end up having to pay higher wages -as long as the marginal disutility of labor is increasing ( > 0). Hence, …rms will cut their prices by less than they would if there was an economy-wide labor market.
When capital and labor are speci…c to sectors, the NKPC becomes:
Note that this Phillips curve is almost identical to the one that obtains under …rm-speci…c factor markets (equation 6), with the crucial exception that there are no 1 s coe¢ cients multiplying the output and investment gaps. The reason is that factor prices are now equalized within sectors, so that, in contrast to the model with …rm-speci…c factors, individual …rms' pricing decisions have no impact on their marginal cost. Suppose a sector is hit by a shock that reduces its demand. With economy-wide factor markets, marginal costs are not a¤ected by …rms'pricing decisions. The same is true in the presence of sectoral factor markets. Any given …rm can reduce its price without worrying that its relative increase in output will put upward pressure on factor prices. The mechanism at work in the latter model is thus seen to be the same as in the model with economy-wide factor markets, but operating at the sectoral level. Indeed, if sectors are identical in terms of price rigidity, the dynamics of sectoral output gaps in response to an aggregate disturbance will the same in all sectors (ỹ s;t =ỹ t ), and equations (5) and (8) become identical, and simplify to:
The same does not happen when factors are …rm-speci…c, because …rms still need to internalize the e¤ects of their pricing decisions on their marginal cost, through factor prices. The corresponding equation with homogeneous price rigidity simpli…es to:
where the coe¢ cient embeds the e¤ects of …rm speci…city. 11 When sectors are heterogeneous, the Phillips curve with sectoral speci…cities di¤ers from the Phillips curve under economy-wide factor markets only in that ! now multiplies sectoral output gaps rather than the aggregate output gap. The reason for this di¤erence is that factor prices now also depend on sectoral conditions. The ! P S s=1 f s sỹs;t term summarizes the e¤ects of sectoral conditions on marginal costs, keeping aggregate output constant. These e¤ects operate through increasing marginal disutility of labor and decreasing marginal product of capital -which a¤ect sectoral factor prices. The P S s=1 f s s ỹ t term captures the e¤ects of aggregate conditions on marginal costs, which continue to operate through households' decreasing marginal utility of consumption. In the model with economy-wide factor markets, the …rst e¤ect hinges on the aggregate output gap, rather than on sectoral gaps. 12 Whether the model with sectoral speci…city produces larger or smaller non-neutralities than the models with economy-wide or …rm-speci…c factor markets is thus a quantitative question, to which we turn next.
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we parameterize our three models and analyze their quantitative predictions. We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1 to 1=2, labor supply elasticity at 0.5, and the usual labor share ( = 2=3). The consumer discount factor implies a time-discount rate of 4% per year.
For the …nal-good aggregator, we set the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the same sector to = 7. The elasticity of substitution between varieties of di¤erent sectors should arguably be smaller than within sectors. We assume a unit elasticity of substitution across sectors, = 1 (i.e.
the aggregator that converts sectoral into …nal output is Cobb-Douglas).
To specify the process for nominal aggregate demand, the literature usually relies on estimates based on nominal GDP, or on monetary aggregates such as M1 or M2. With quarterly data, estimates of m typically fall in the range of 0:4 to 0:7, 13 which maps into a range of roughly 0:75 0:90 at a monthly frequency. We set z = 0:8, and the standard deviation of the shocks "m = 0:6% (roughly 1% at a quarterly frequency), in line with the same estimation results. 14 Finally, to discipline our analysis, we follow an approach that is common in the real business cycle literature (e.g., Chari et al. 2000) and calibrate the investment adjustment-cost parameter ( ) to match the standard deviation of investment in the data relative to the standard deviation of GDP.
Whenever we analyze a di¤erent version of the model, we redo the calibration. 15 It remains to specify the distribution of price rigidity. We start by investigating whether the model with sectoral factor markets is ‡exible enough to approximate both the model with …rm- 1 2 Incidentally, note that in equation (6) ! also multiplies sectoral output gaps. The reason is that the solution of the model is such that the e¤ects of …rm speci…city are subsumed in s , and the model is in e¤ect solved by taking sectoral averages (see the Appendix). 1 3 See, for instance, Mankiw and Reis (2002). 1 4 All results for volatilities scale-up proportionately with "z . 1 5 It turns out that the calibration of the three versions of the model usually yields very similar values for .
speci…c factors and the model with economy-wide factor markets. To that end, we experiment with di¤erent arbitrary distributions of price stickiness in economies with 3 sectors. 16 Subsequently, we use the available microeconomic evidence on price rigidity in the U.S. to discipline the calibration of the three versions of the model.
Arbitrary distributions of price rigidity
We analyze economies with 3 sectors, and entertain two alternative distributions of price rigidity. In both cases the frequencies of price changes ( k ) in sectors 1-3 are, respectively, 1, 1/12, and 1/30 -corresponding to price changes of, on average, once a month, once a year, and once every 30 months.
We di¤erentiate the two distributions by changing the sectoral weights.
In the …rst distribution, which we term " ‡exible distribution", the weights of sectors 1-3 are, respectively, 85%, 7.5%, and 7.5%. In the second distribution, which we label "sticky distribution", the weights of sectors 1-3 are, respectively, 7.5%, 7.5%, and 85%. The results show that, under the ‡exible distribution, the sector-speci…c factor market economy generates more monetary non-neutrality than the other two models. In contrast, under the sticky distribution that model is much more similar to the model with economy-wide factor markets. This result suggests that, depending on the distribution of price rigidity, the pattern of pricing interactions re ‡ected in the NKPC under sectoral factor markets is rich enough to emulate the dynamics of both an economy with strong real rigidities (such as the one with …rm-speci…c factor markets) and an economy with strategic substitutability in pricing decisions (such as the one with economy-wide factor markets).
Empirical distribution of price rigidity
Having shown that the model with sectoral factor markets can behave similarly to the other two models that we consider, we now discipline our quantitative analysis by focusing on the empirical distribution of price rigidity for the U.S. economy. We use the statistics on the frequency of regular price changes -those that are not due to sales or product substitutions -reported by Nakamura 1 6 We do so motivated by our …nding that a 3-sector economy with a suitably chosen distribution of price rigidity provides a very good approximation to the dynamics of a multisector economy calibrated to the empirical distribution of price rigidity in the U.S. See details below. classes. Each class is identi…ed with a sector in the model. 18 The frequency of price changes for each expenditure class is obtained as the weighted average of the frequencies for the underlying categories, using the expenditure weights provided by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) . Finally, expenditure-class weights are given by the sum of the expenditure weights for those categories. The resulting average monthly frequency of price changes is = P K k=1 f k k = 0:211, which implies that prices change on average once every 4:7 months.
Solving, calibrating and simulating the multisector model with 67 sectors is computationally costly.
To sidestep this problem we work with a 3-sector approximation to the underlying 67-sector economy.
We choose the frequencies of price changes and sectoral weights in the approximating model to match a suitably chosen set of moments of the cross-sectional distribution of price stickiness of the original 67-sector economy. This delivers an extremely good approximation to the dynamics of a 67-sector model, under all three assumptions about factor markets (details are available upon request). Figure 2 reports our main results. It shows impulse response functions to a monetary shock for the three models, economy-wide, sectoral, and …rm-speci…c factor markets. Focusing …rst on the IRFs for GDP, the chart shows that the economy-wide factor model implies the smallest monetary non-neutrality. The sectoral and …rm-speci…c factor models are more similar on impact and during the …rst few months, featuring more sizable non-neutralities than the economy-wide model. In the medium to long run, however, the model with sectoral speci…city quickly approaches the one with economy-wide factor markets. At the end of the day, the model with …rm-speci…c factors generates much longer lasting e¤ects of monetary shocks on real GDP than the other two models. Despite the similarities across the three models with respect to their impact on in ‡ation, the model with economy-wide implies a slightly larger initial impact on in ‡ation, which is the ‡ip side of its smaller impact on real GDP. The remaining charts report the impulse response functions for other main variables of the three models and basically replicate the patterns obtained for real GDP.
Robustness
In our previous analyses we left monetary policy unspeci…ed and postulated an exogenous stochastic process for nominal aggregate demand. In this section, we consider a speci…cation with an explicit 1 7 Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) report statistics for 272 categories. We discard the category "Girls'Outerwear", for which the reported frequency of regular price changes is zero. We renormalize the expenditure weights to sum to unity. 1 8 As an example of what this aggregation entails, the resulting "New and Used Motor Vehicles" class consists of the categories "Subcompact Cars", "New Motorcycles", "Used Cars", "Vehicle Leasing" and "Automobile Rental"; the "Fresh Fruits" class comprises four categories: "Apples", "Bananas", "Oranges, Mandarins etc." and "Other Fresh description of monetary policy. We assume that monetary policy is conducted according to an interestrate rule subject to persistent shocks:
where I t is the short-term nominal interest rate, GDP t is gross domestic product, GDP denotes gross domestic product in steady state, and Y are the parameters associated with Taylor-type interest-rate rules (Taylor 1993) , and t is a persistent shock with process t = t 1 + " " ;t , where " ;t is a zero-mean, unit-variance i:i:d: shock, and 2 [0; 1). We set = 1:5, y = :5=12, and = 0:965. 19 The remaining parameter values are unchanged from the baseline speci…cation. 
Conclusion
Our results show that it matters a great deal whether speci…city in factors of production arises at the …rm or sectoral level. In response to nominal shocks, our parameterized model with sector-speci…c factors yields aggregate dynamics in the short run that resemble those of a model with …rm-speci…c factors. After one to two years, however, the behavior of the model is already more similar to that of a model with economy-wide factor markets.
This result is consistent with the idea that factor price equalization might take place gradually over time, so that …rm-speci…city might be a reasonable short-run approximation, whereas economywide markets might be a better description of how factors of production are allocated in the longer run.
Whether or not this happens in reality is, of course, an empirical question. The s coe¢ cients in equation (6) Note that in a version of the model without capital accumulation, = 1, s simpli…es to = (1 + )
-which is familiar from new Keynesian DSGE models. Details of the derivation of these equations are available upon request.
